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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following a jury trial, the jury found Daniel Abram Taylor guilty of felony lewd conduct
with a minor under sixteen.  The district court imposed a unified sentence of fifteen years, with
five years fixed.  After Mr. Taylor filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) motion for a
reduction of sentence, the district court granted the motion in part and reduced the sentence to a
unified term of fifteen years, with four years fixed.
Mr. Taylor appealed, asserting the district court erred when it admitted into evidence a
photograph of the alleged victim, because the photograph was not relevant and the danger of
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed any probative value the photograph might have had.
Mr. Taylor also asserted the district court abused its discretion when it failed to place him
on probation.
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State argued the photograph of the alleged victim was
relevant, the danger of unfair prejudice did not substantially outweigh the photograph’s probative
value, and any error in admitting into evidence the photograph was harmless.  (See Resp.
Br., pp.9-15.)  The State also argued Mr. Taylor had not established the district court abused its
discretion when it failed to place him on probation.  (See Resp. Br., pp.16-19.)
This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s arguments on the photograph of the
alleged victim.  Mr. Taylor also challenges the State’s contention that he has not established the
district court abused its discretion when it failed to place him on probation, but he relies on the
arguments presented in his Appellant’s Brief.
2Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Taylor’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
3ISSUES
I. Did the district court err when it admitted into evidence a photograph of the alleged
victim?
II. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to place Mr. Taylor on probation?
4ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Admitted Into Evidence A Photograph Of The Alleged Victim
A. Introduction
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court erred when it admitted into evidence a photograph of
the alleged victim, A.B.T., taken during her interview with Detective Shaw.  The photograph was
not relevant.  Even if the photograph were relevant, it should have been excluded under Idaho
Rule of Evidence 403 because its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice to Mr. Taylor.  The State has not proven, beyond a reasonable doubt,
that there was no reasonable possibility the admission of the photograph contributed to the
conviction.  Additionally, Mr. Taylor’s motion for a new trial should have been granted on the
basis the improper admission of the photograph was an error of law.
B. The Photograph Was Not Relevant
The photograph was not relevant.  Contrary to the district court’s apparent determination
(see Tr., p.253, Ls.21-23), the photograph did not have any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that was of consequence to the determination of the action, namely the methods
Detective Shaw used during the interview with A.B.T., more probable or less probable. See
I.R.E. 401.  Thus, the photograph was not relevant to the procedures by which Detective Shaw
conducted the interview. See id.  The photograph, because it was not relevant, should not have
been admitted. See I.R.E. 402.
The State argues, “the fact that A.B.T. was a young child who went through the process
of going to the Childrens’ Advocacy Center to be interviewed by Detective Shaw in an
5unadorned  (i.e.,  no  toys,  dolls,  etc.)  setting  was  relevant  to  the  determination  of  this  case,
whether challenged or not.”  (Resp. Br., p.12.)  However, this argument fails to explain why the
photograph was relevant to whether the proper procedures were used during the interview.
Detective Shaw, when she testified on the National Institute of Child Health and Human
Development (NICHD) model she had been trained to use for child forensic interviews, did not
indicate having an unadorned setting was part of the NICHD model.  (See Tr., p.244, L.3 –
p.249, L.9.)  Rather, Detective Shaw testified, “[t]he NICHD model is actually a script.  It
specifically lists out the questions that you are to ask.”  (Tr., p.245, Ls.20-22.)  The photograph,
depicting only a single moment during the approximately twenty-five-minute-long interview (see
Tr., p.251, Ls.5-6), would not have shown any deviations from that script, or any other
irregularities that might have occurred over the course of the interview.  Thus, the photograph
was not relevant to the procedures by which Detective Shaw conducted the interview with
A.B.T. See I.R.E. 401.
Based on cases from other jurisdictions, the State also argues, “[s]imilar to homicide
cases in which the state is often permitted to introduce an ‘in-life’ photo of the victim to prove
the victim’s identity or show the victim as a living human being, the jury was entitled to see a
photo of A.B.T. to be able to view her as more than just a name bandied about in court.”  (See
Resp. Br., pp.12-13.)  However, the instant case is not a homicide case.  Further, the State has
acknowledged that Mr. Taylor “does not dispute that the alleged victim of his lewd conduct was
A.B.T.” (Resp. Br., pp.11-12), meaning the alleged victim’s identity was not at issue.
In sum, the photograph was not relevant, and it should not have been admitted.
6C. The Photograph Should Have Been Excluded Under Rule 403
Even if the photograph were relevant, it should have been excluded under Idaho Rule of
Evidence 403 because its minimal probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice to Mr. Taylor. See I.R.E. 403.  Thus, the district court abused its discretion
when it admitted the photograph under Rule 403, because it did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
The State argues “there is nothing about the unadorned photo of A.B.T. that would draw
undue sympathy from the jury—an unrehearsed still screen shot from the videotaped interview
as  she  sat  at  a  small  table  across  from  Detective  Shaw.”   (Resp.  Br.,  p.14.)   However,  as
Mr. Taylor’s counsel’s asserted, the State was “trying to offer it because there’s a cute little girl
sitting in there.  He’s trying to do nothing but draw sympathy from the jury.”  (See Tr., p.252,
Ls.11-13.)  Counsel further asserted, “there is an extreme danger that that’s exactly the only
thing that the jury would use that photograph for.”  (Tr., p.252, Ls.14-15.)
In response, the State contends, “[t]hat A.B.T. is a ‘cute little girl’ does not mean the jury
was blinded by sympathy in rendering a verdict.  By that reasoning, every ‘cute little girl’ sexual
abuse victim testifying at trial would have to be screened off from the jury to prevent the jury
from being unfairly swayed by sympathy.”  (Resp. Br., p.14.)  This contention by the State fails
because the probative value of such trial testimony could conceivably be greater than the
minimal probative value of the photograph in this case. Cf. State v. Matthews, 124 Idaho 806,
813-14 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding, in a lewd conduct case, that evidence including testimony from
the three alleged victims describing inappropriate touching was sufficient to support the
convictions).  The Rule 403 balancing test here, rather than assess hypothetical trial testimony
7from another case, involves weighing the photograph’s danger of unfair prejudice against its
minimal probative value.
The photograph should have been excluded under Rule 403, because the danger of unfair
prejudice substantially outweighed its minimal probative value.  The district court abused its
discretion when it admitted the photograph, because it did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards.
D. The State Has Not Proven, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That There Was No Reasonable
Possibility The Admission Of The Photograph Contributed To The Conviction
Mr. Taylor asserts the State has not proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no
reasonable possibility the admission of the photograph contributed to the conviction.  Thus, the
judgment of conviction should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the district court
for a new trial. See State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
The State argues, “the proof of [Mr.] Taylor’s guilt was overwhelming.”  (Resp.
Br., p.15.)  Based on the evidence presented, the State argues “this Court should conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that, even if the photo of A.B.T. had not been admitted into evidence
at trial, the result would have been the same.”  (See Resp. Br., p.15.)  However, the State’s
harmlessness argument relies upon an incorrect standard.
The harmless error test established in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967),
which requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained, is applied to all observed error in Idaho. Perry, 150 Idaho at
221.  In Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993), the United States Supreme Court explained
the inquiry under Chapman “is  not  whether,  in  a  trial  that  occurred  without  the  error,  a  guilty
verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this
8trial was surely unattributable to the error.” Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 279.  Further, the Idaho
Supreme Court in Perry observed the Chapman Court had criticized over-reliance on the
overwhelming evidence standard. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 223 (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S. at
23).  The Perry Court recognized an overwhelming evidence analysis, but in the context of
erroneous jury instructions. See id. at 224.
Put otherwise, the correct standard for harmless error requires the State here to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that there was no reasonable possibility the admission of the
photograph contributed to the conviction. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 227.  Through relying on an
incorrect standard for harmlessness, the State has not met this burden.
E. The  District  Court  Abused  Its  Discretion  When  It  Denied  Mr.  Taylor’s  Motion  For  A
New Trial
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a
new trial, because the motion should have been granted on the basis the improper admission of
the photograph was an error of law.  For the reasons discussed above in Section I.B., as well as
on Pages 11-12 of the Appellant’s Brief, the photograph was not relevant.  Thus, the district
court’s admission of the irrelevant photograph was an error of law. See State v. Carlson, 134
Idaho 389, 397 (Ct. App. 2000).  The district court therefore should have granted Mr. Taylor’s
motion for a new trial. See I.C. § 19-2406(5).  By denying the motion for a new trial, the district
court abused its discretion, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal standards.
See Hedger, 115 Idaho at 600.  The order denying the motion for a new trial and the judgment of
conviction  should  be  vacated,  and  the  case  should  be  remanded  to  the  district  court  for  a
new trial.
9II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Place Mr. Taylor On Probation
Mr. Taylor asserts the district court abused its discretion when it, despite his
recommendation, failed to place him on probation.  The State’s argument on this issue is
unremarkable, and no further reply is necessary.  Accordingly, Mr. Taylor would refer this Court
to Pages 17-20 of his Appellant’s Brief.
CONCLUSION
For  the  above  reasons,  as  well  as  the  reasons  contained  in  the  Appellant’s  Brief,
Mr. Taylor respectfully requests this Court vacate his judgment of conviction, or vacate the
district court’s order denying his motion for a new trial and the judgment of conviction, and
remand his case to the district court for a new trial.  Alternatively, Mr. Taylor respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate.
DATED this 1st day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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